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1. Introduction 
 The risk management decision is of fundamental importance to any firm and must 
be addressed by boards of directors when deciding which managers to hire and how best 
to compensate them for their labor. To the extent that any policy decision made by the 
firm is determined by its managers, analyzing a company’s risk-management policy 
without simultaneously analyzing the motivations of the management can give only 
partial insight into the reasons behind any decision. This study examines the effect of 
executive compensation incentives on the risk management decisions of insurance 
companies.  
The managerial motivation literature can be divided into two major approaches. 
One approach attempts to model the decision made by the manager in a principal-agent 
framework where the goal of compensation design is to urge the manager to expend a 
high level of effort on the firm. I do not follow this technique as the anecdotal problem is 
not to get managers to expend a high level of effort, but for them to spend that effort on 
value-creating activities for the benefit of stockholders rather than on perquisites with 
private benefits which they alone enjoy. I focus on the second approach, examining the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity measurement. In these studies, the empirical goal is to 
identify the relationship between managerial decisions and the incentives contained in the 
structure of the manager's compensation package. These sensitivities provide a measure 
of how the manager’s payoff varies with the rewards to shareholders and, consequently, 
of how closely the incentives of the managers are aligned with those of the firm's owners. 
I particularly investigate the observable decisions associated with a company’s risk-
management policies. 
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 I examine managers’ responses to their incentives using a data set composed of 
the largest publicly-traded insurance groups from 1992 to 2004, combining operating 
information from regulatory filings with publicly available information on the 
compensation of their executives. Because the handling and measurement of risk is the 
primary business of insurance companies, these firms should particularly focus on this 
part of their firm’s decisions. By focusing on a single industry, I am also able to examine 
the firm’s decisions at a close level and make use of decision variables specific to the 
industry. The use of the reinsurance variable and business-specific leverage measures is a 
significant improvement to the literature as it allows me to directly measure a company’s 
risk-taking and exposure to bankruptcy risk in the company’s main line of business as 
opposed to the more noisy proxies used in studies such as Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 
(2006), Tufano (1996), Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997), Rogers (2002), Anderson, 
Bates, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2000), Baghat and Welch (1995). Proxies have included 
leverage, corporate focus, research and development, and capital expenditure, and find 
mixed results. As the risk due to the insurance policies written by the firm cannot be 
easily hedged through derivatives contracts, reinsurance can provide a more complete 
measure of risk exposure. The decision of how many premiums to write relative to capital 
reserves is likely a substitute for this decision and I examine it as another risk decision 
made by the management. If managers respond to board-given incentives, then it is 
possible for the board of directors to induce shareholder-desired corporate policies 
through careful design of the compensation package. As incentives are mainly 
determined by board-adjustable option parameters such as the time-to-maturity of the 
options, it should be possible for companies to change their risk-profile over time in the 
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interest of investors. In the end, these decisions may be a path through which boards may 
design executive compensation packages to increase shareholder value.  
 I find that, when accounting for relations between companies and structural policy 
decisions, the incentives given to the management have the ability to alter some aspects 
of the firm’s risk-management decisions, although whether this actually increases the 
risk-profile of the firm is unclear. Depending on the measurement variable, results are 
mixed, indicating that rewarding managers for bearing risk, as measured through their 
reported compensation schemes, may actually encourage firms to conduct less business in 
risky lines, although they retain more of this business on their own books. Managerial 
incentives appear to play some role in determining firm decisions and the risk-
management decision appears to be a potential path through which managerial incentives 
may affect firm performance, although the market’s valuation of these decisions is weak. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews the 
existing literature of corporate risk-management and the role of executive compensation. 
Section three describes the sources of the data on insurance companies and the 
compensation of their managers. Sections four and five describe the empirical set-up and 
results. Section six focuses on various robustness tests. Section seven concludes. 
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2. Literature Review and Identification of Contributions 
2.1 Reinsurance Literature 
 Executives are concerned with their firm’s risk management because of the many 
benefits it provides to the various stakeholders in the firm. Shareholders gain value from 
reduced financing costs because of a lower discount rate due to larger and more stable 
cash-flows which reduce the chance of incurring bankruptcy costs (Stulz, 1996). Value is 
created through various channels including the level and type of projects chosen by 
managers, debt and tax costs, expected bankruptcy costs as well as lower transaction 
costs with other stakeholders and counterparties due to the increased likelihood of 
continuing the business relationship. Employees of the firm benefit from financial 
rewards and increased stability as they cannot diversify their employment risk as 
shareholders can with their financial risk. 
 Managers have several reasons, which are explained below (Stulz (1990), Stulz 
(1984), Mayers and Smith (1982)), to control the risk exposure of a firm and to adjust this 
exposure according to their personal preferences, which likely differ from those of 
shareholders. This differential creates agency costs from the shareholder’s perspective 
and leads shareholders to take action to try and reduce these costs since managers, even 
while they may principally act in the shareholder’s interest, are at the same time pursuing 
their own private goals. 
 Agency problems may result from several factors. First, managers likely have a 
higher proportion of their wealth invested in the firm, as well as relying on the firm’s 
continued existence for their current and expected future income. Managers also depend 
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on the firm for non-monetary rewards in a way that shareholders do not. Non-monetary 
aspects of compensation may include awards, reputation, and the potential for promotion. 
If corporate risk management increases shareholder value, then actions by executives to 
reduce risk will also be desired by shareholders. Since it is often impossible or illegal for 
executives to hedge their financial exposure to a firm, they may attempt to conduct this 
hedging at the corporate, rather than the individual, level. 
Though shareholders and managers may both find risk management beneficial, 
conflict between management and shareholders may arise if they desire different levels of 
hedging. Because they are assumed to have risk-averse utility functions, the management 
may wish to hedge beyond the point where hedging increases firm value - managers are 
primarily interested in the value of hedging in preventing bankruptcy rather than benefits 
from value creation through tax savings, reduced underinvestment and asset substitution 
problems and more optimal risk sharing. This may lead managers to implement strategies 
which, while decreasing the risk of bankruptcy, actually lower the overall value of the 
firm. A firm might engage in diversification through conglomerate-building or enter into 
lines of business where the company cannot add value (Bartam, 2000), for example. 
Empirically, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2003) show that firms whose managers are 
rewarded for bearing risk are more focused in their business activities. 
Thus, the incentives given through contracts and compensation need to be 
carefully constructed to avoid incenting managers towards value-destroying activities 
while still rewarding value-creating ones. Most companies accomplish this linkage by 
tying employee compensation to stock price rather than accounting targets, which are 
often under some managerial control and may be easier to manipulate. Incentives, which 
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include options, need to be carefully targeted as increasing rewards to risk can help to 
reduce managerial risk aversion but may also induce speculative behavior - while tying 
rewards directly to stock price may even decrease the manager’s desire to bear risk. 
 Empirical studies such as Schrand and Unal (1998), Tufano (1996), Haushalter 
(1997), Gay and Nam (1998) have shown that executives who are paid with more option 
compensation tend to hedge less, lending credence to the behavior-altering abilities of 
incentives. Ross (2004) shows that there is no incentive schedule that can make all 
expected-utility-maximizing managers less risk averse so grants must be tailored by the 
corporate boards to individual circumstances. In addition, Ju, Leland and Senbet (2002) 
show that the effect of options may be indeterminate, inducing either too much or too 
little risk taking depending on the underlying utility function and investment technology. 
Lewellyn (2003) and Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005) provide evidence that 
options, especially if they are in the money, could discourage risk taking. This is because 
in-the-money options lose the convexity of their payouts and offer a payout schedule 
more like that of restricted or pure stock. Stock has been shown in Stulz (1984) to 
exacerbate risk aversion because it reduces the manager’s diversification of wealth. 
 Existing research has studied various financial and operating decisions from a 
corporate risk-management framework. In general there are few conclusive results. 
Financial strategy – measured by leverage, share repurchases, or derivative use – tends to 
be (weakly) related to managerial stock and options ownership. Operating decisions such 
as expanding into a new line of business or investing in research and development also 
appear to be related to managerial compensation. 
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 Other studies have shown that managers respond to incentives by increasing firm 
risk and decreasing hedging activities. DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990) demonstrate 
that firms which approve stock option plans for executives display an increase in stock 
return variance, and Guay (1999) shows that the standard deviation of returns are 
associated with contemporaneous vega, the sensitivity of executive wealth to a change in 
stock volatility. Demonstrating how incentives granted in one year may take time to be 
implemented and to have an effect on observable firm decisions, Rajgopal and Shevlin 
(2002) show that lagged vega is associated with increased oil exploration risk. Providing 
further evidence of the effect of incentives, Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002) show that 
the use of derivatives is negatively associated with Vega and positively associated with 
delta. Examining other risk measures, Cohen, Hall and Viceira (2000) find that leverage 
and stock return volatility are both positively related to the elasticity of CEO wealth in 
stock return volatility. 
 This paper contributes to this literature by using a purer measure of risk-bearing 
and a comprehensive dataset of the insurance industry. By examining firms at the 
insurance group level, I can eliminate capital cost, internal risk shifting, tax, and other 
reasons why companies might appear to be purchasing reinsurance but are actually just 
shifting it within the firm. By limiting the data set to the insurance industry I examine 
firms which have advanced risk-management strategies and I am able to reduce the 
unobservable differences between firms. I am also able to examine and use industry-
specific variables which should affect a firm’s risk-bearing decision. 
 I also demonstrate that incentives appear to lead to changes in company policy, 
implying a role for compensation in directing corporate decisions. As most firm decisions 
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are made by the management, it is therefore necessary to consider the incentives of the 
managerial team in any study of firm decision-making. 
2.2 Hypotheses and Decision Variables 
 Based on the literature I make several hypotheses on the role of executive 
incentives in firm decisions. These hypotheses are given below and the empirical 
techniques used to test them are examined in section 4 of this paper. 
2.2.1 Firm Decisions 
 If managers are responding to the increased rewards for risk by increasing the 
volatility of firm earnings then they should do so by altering the level of observable firm-
risk variables. 
 Hypothesis 1) Ceteris paribus, managers with a higher level of vega should 
increase the level of risk in firm-decision variables. 
 To measure risk and determine if managers are attempting to make riskier 
decisions, I examine several observable variables which capture a variety of insurer 
decisions that affect the risk of their business.  
2.2.2 Risk Management and Volatility 
 If these variables are to have an effect on the managerial incentives tied to stock 
performance, then it is necessary that riskier actions should increase the volatility of stock 
returns: 
 Hypothesis 2) Ceteris paribus, riskier choices in the firm decision variables 
should increase the volatility of stock returns for the insurance group. 
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 This hypothesis provides the link between the actions that managers are taking 
when setting their firm policies and the rewards that they see from their incentive pay. 
This link is necessary if managers are translating their incentives into observable firm 
decisions through the risk management channel. 
2.2.3 Reinsurance 
 This study examines the reinsurance purchase decisions made by insurance 
companies as one way in which they manage their risk-management decisions. The use of 
the reinsurance variable allows a direct measure of an insurance company’s risk-bearing 
and exposure to bankruptcy risk in the company’s main line of business, as opposed to 
the more noisy proxies used in other studies such as those mentioned in the section 1. 
Proxies have included leverage, corporate focus, research and development, and capital 
expenditure, and they find mixed results. The risk to the firm due to writing insurance 
policies cannot be easily hedged through derivatives contracts and therefore reinsurance 
can provide a more complete measure of this particular risk exposure. A higher level of 
vega should be associated with less reinsurance purchase and more risk retained by the 
firm. 
2.2.4 Premium/Surplus Ratio 
 Concurrently with determining its reinsurance purchase a firm is determining 
what amount of insurance policies, and their associated expected risk as measured by 
premiums, it should write in relation to its surplus. Surplus is the reserve that insurance 
companies keep to protect them from larger-than-expected losses and hence the 
likelihood of ruin. A larger ratio makes bankruptcy more likely for the firm and is 
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therefore a more risky decision. A higher ratio should therefore be associated with higher 
levels of vega. 
2.2.5 Proportion of Business in Long-Tailed Lines 
 Certain lines of business expose the firm to more risk than others. These are 
known as schedule-P or long-tailed lines. I use the same definition as in Phillips, 
Cummins, and Allen (1996) and shown in Appendix 1. One way for firms to respond to 
risk-incentives would be to keep all other firm decision variables constant but simply 
conduct more business in riskier lines. I therefore compare the other firm decision 
variables with the amount of business conducted in these longer-liability lines. A higher 
proportion should be associated with higher levels of vega if firms are increasing risk in 
this way. 
2.2.6 A.M. Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio 
 The A.M. Best Capital Adequacy Ratio measures a company's relative capital 
strength compared to industry composites as established by A.M. Best and is related to its 
premium surplus ratio. The specific calculation is adjusted surplus divided by net 
required capital. Adjusted surplus is calculated from reported surplus, which is then 
modified with adjustments related to loss reserves, assets, and off-balance-sheet liability 
exposures. The net required capital is calculated by separating investments into seven 
different risk categories. The capital is then determined as a sum of these, less a 
covariance adjustment which controls for the independence of risks across securities 
category. This ratio is important in determining the company’s A.M. Best rating and is 
therefore another measure of the firm’s leverage decision – one which is specific to 
insurance companies. A higher ratio means that the company has more surplus relative to 
Jeremy Skog - 11 -  
the level deemed necessary according to its business. Therefore a lower ratio should be 
associated with higher levels of vega. 
2.3 Additional Contributions to the Literature 
 The main contributions that this paper makes to the literature are further 
examining the role of incentives in firm risk decisions within a specific industry using 
previously unexamined measures of firm risk-bearing. By focusing on a specific industry 
I am able to include industry-specific control variables which are determinants of the 
company’s risk-management decision as well as specific measures of risk-bearing. 
Because the business of the insurance industry is to manage risk they should have well-
developed methods of handling risk policy and it should be a major focus of their 
management, thus the insurance industry seems ideal for this sort of study. I also examine 
whether companies are responding selectively – whether they simply take on riskier 
business while keeping the amount of business constant or whether managers make 
generally riskier or generally safer decisions. The variables used in this study cover most 
of the risk decisions available to insurance firms – types of premiums to write, amount to 
retain, and level of capital to back them up.
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3. Data and Variable Creation 
3.1 Data Gathering and Merging 
Information on the insurance companies and groups is assembled from the yearly 
NAIC statements from 1993 through 2004, years which were chosen based on data 
availability. Data for the year 1992 was obtained from historical data in the 1993 
statement and used for creating lagged values. This insurance data is merged with 
information on executives from Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database and 
Compustat. CRSP data is also used for stock return information. The merging of these 
datasets restricts the type of companies which can be included in this study. These 
restrictions are explained below and comparisons are made between my specific dataset 
and the wider, unrestricted, market datasets.  
The NAIC data files give information on the line-level business of insurers in 
terms of premiums written and business retained. From this it is possible to construct 
variables measuring a firm’s exposure to policies and diversification, discussed below. It 
is also possible to determine the volatility and correlation of losses and investment 
earnings, which is expected to have an effect on risk decisions. Discrepancies in data 
definitions between years are resolved with the goal of producing variables which are as 
consistent as possible over the entire data range. This data was merged with the A.M. 
Best dataset which provides higher-level summary data on firms and served as a useful 
check on my variable calculations. Summary statistics for relevant variables appear in 
table 1. 
 
Jeremy Skog - 13 -  
3.1.1 Formation of Insurance Groups 
 Since an achievement of this study over prior literature is examining a more 
overarching ownership structure by studying insurance groups, rather than companies, a 
key part was properly tracking group ownership in the universe of insurance companies 
over time. Examining reinsurance at the insurance group level separates the actual off-
loading of risk from internal risk-shifting and capital structure decisions. Examining risk-
bearing at only the company level may yield spurious results because the risk transfer 
may be made for internal cost-of-capital or diversification reasons and may not actually 
represent the truly desired risk-management decision. CEO data from Execucomp is at 
the level of the insurer holding group so observable firm decisions should be measured at 
the same level as the incentives which inspire them. I created a proprietary merge-key to 
track group ownership of companies by year as they were merged, acquired and sold. The 
identifiers within the AM Best data were often erroneous when combined as panel-data 
as the raw data is isolated by year and did not accurately track ownership of companies 
over time. 
 For each insurance group, I created a list of NAIC company codes corresponding 
to firms which the group owned in each year and used this to fill in observations where 
companies might not be listed under the groups which owned them, including years for 
which group ownership data was missing. I created a record of group mergers with the 
acquiring group listed as owning all companies previously listed owned by the acquired 
group, unless they were specifically listed under another group’s code and hence 
ownership. Furthermore, the code number assigned to groups varied over time in the 
original AM Best data. These codes were reconciled so that a group was listed under a 
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single code for all of the years it exists in the dataset. If a company was owned by a 
particular group in year t and in year t+2 it as assumed to be owned by the same group in 
year t+1 unless specifically noted otherwise. The first year a company appears under 
group ownership in the dataset, it is assumed to be owned by that group for all previous 
years in the dataset. If the company had been independent, it would have been listed 
under its own group heading. By making these assumptions, I account for all missing data 
on group ownership.  
 There was not a pre-existing variable which identified firms in both the NAIC 
data and in the COMPUSTAT data. I therefore created a merge-key which was used to 
merge the two data sets. Companies were matched as seemed best appropriate on 
information such as stock ticker symbol, group name, chief executive name, and 
headquarters location. This key was then used to join the data sets. The final result is a 
set of panel data identified at the insurer group/year level. There are a total of 77 groups 
appearing in the data, although not each one appears in every year due to the changing 
nature of the insurance industry and company mergers and acquisitions. The names of 
groups appearing appear in Appendix 2.
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3.2 Comparison to Full Data Sets 
 To determine how the firms in my final dataset compare to the overall datasets in 
Execucomp and NAIC, I compare a few key variables to ensure consistency and note 
differences between my data and the wider market. 
3.2.1 ExecuComp 
 The characteristics of the insurance industry executives included are broadly 
similar to those in the managerial market as a whole, although they exhibit the usual 
attributes associated with those who work in the financial world. Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2006) study the entire Execucomp database for all industries and present 
summary statistics which describe that database. 
 The executives within my data set have almost exactly the same age profile as 
those in the larger data set, although they have been at their jobs a somewhat shorter time. 
The differences are not statistically significant. Executives in the insurance industry 
appear to receive slightly more cash pay than those in the wider data set – an average of 
$1.3 million as opposed to $1.1 million in the overall data set. Median pay is higher as 
well at around $1 million as opposed to an industry-wide median of $800,000. Pay for the 
entire management team is higher as well, with an average of $4.3 million in the 
insurance industry compared to $2.5 million in all industries. 
 The most important difference between the insurance industry and others is its 
greater use of incentive compensation. This has grown over time as shown in figure 1, 
and composes almost half of an executive’s take-home pay. The average calculated delta 
for executives in my data set is 1,039 as compared to an overall average of 600. This 
difference appears to be due mainly to a few executives who receive large options 
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packages as the insurance industry median is 275, only slightly larger than the 
Execucomp median of 206. The situation is similar with vega. The insurance-CEO 
average is 114, compared with a total-industry average of 80. The respective medians are 
48 in the insurance industry and 34 across all businesses. The standard deviations in my 
data set are larger as well. It appears that the executive market in the insurance industry 
pays more than average and makes more use of incentive pay. Further, there are several 
CEOs who have very generous pay packages which make large use of incentive pay.  
Figure 1: 
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3.2.2 Insurance Company Data (A.M. Best and NAIC) 
 Due to the process of creating the data set, the included groups are not necessarily 
representative of the entire insurance industry. Because the NAIC data was merged with 
Execucomp data, only publicly traded companies are included. Execucomp includes data 
on top executives (usually the five highest-paid officers) from companies within the S&P 
1,500, so an insurer must be a member of this set to be included. The S&P 1,500 is 
composed of companies in the S&P 500 large-cap, S&P 400 mid-cap, and S&P 600 
small-cap indices. Because this index is dependent on firms still trading, not all 
information is available for every company in every year. 
 To determine how the insurer groups in my dataset compare with past literature 
on the subject, I reproduce the regressions from Garven and Lamm Tennant (2003) at 
both the company and the insurer group level and present the results in table 2. The form 
of the regressions run is given by the equation: 
Equation 1: 
iii tXR µβα +++= 1  
 The control variables here, X, are purely the firm structure variables, and do not 
include managerial incentives or characteristics. t represents the year dummies and u is an 
error term. Since previous studies examined reinsurance purchase rather than risk 
retained, the expected signs must be flipped when comparing to previous studies. This 
has been done in the ‘predicted’ column of table 2 to make the signs equivalent, and to 
simplify comparisons with previous studies. 
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The company-level data provide a direct comparison between the data sets in each 
study while the group-level regressions allow extrapolation for further results presented 
in this paper. The similarities in the results between these regressions show that the 
capital-structure story of reinsurance purchase appears to hold at different ownership 
levels and that this data set is similar to those used in previous studies. Some differences 
would naturally exist because the data is constructed from different sources and over 
different time periods, with Garven and Lamm Tenant (2003) using the A.M. Best 
database and my using the raw NAIC data to construct the variables.  
 For the most part, the actions of my included firms appear to be similar to those 
results found in the prior study. The signs for significant variables are the same at both 
the corporation and group level, indicating that there is not too much bias in observed 
firm behavior due to the selection and aggregation into groups. The only times the signs 
of the coefficients differ is on the proportion of business on long tailed lines. At the 
company level the sign is negative, indicating more risky business is associated with 
more reinsurance purchase, while at the group level the coefficient is positive in sign. 
This could be due to reinsurance being used to shift risk within the insurer group, while at 
the group level insurers are making either generally riskier or generally safer risk 
decisions when choosing policy.
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3.3 Chief Variables of Interest 
 
 I investigate two categories of variables which are of chief interest in this study. 
They are: those which measure the risk decisions of the firm and those which measure the 
incentives given to managers. 
 The first category includes variables which represent the risk management 
decisions of the firm. These include the firm’s reinsurance purchase decision – which 
measures how much of its premium risk it chooses to keep on its own books. Second, the 
proportion of business which is conducted in long-tailed lines, which measures how risky 
the insurance company’s business is. There are also two variables which measure the 
firm’s capital-structure decision by measuring its leverage. The first of these variables is 
the premium/surplus ratio, which measures how much business the company is 
conducting in  relation to its loss reserves. Second is the A.M. Best Capital Adequacy 
ratio ( described fully at: 
http://www.ambest.com/ratings/methodology/BCAR_UNDERSTANDING_PC_Insurers.
pdf  ) which is a more specific ratio measuring how much capital the firm retains relative 
to the business it has underwritten, adjusted for the risk of each. 
 The variables which measure the incentives given to management include the two 
major sensitivity variables – the sensitivity of executive’s wealth to a change in the stock 
price and the sensitivity in wealth to a change in stock price volatility. I also examine the 
overall level of cash and bonus pay as a proxy for how much the executive receives in 
total pay from the firm and how relatively risk-averse the executive is likely to be. 
3.3.1 Firm Decision Variables 
Reinsurance 
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 I use the ratio of total business less reinsurance ceded plus reinsurance assumed 
over total business written plus reinsurance assumed as the measure of risk retained by 
the firm, similar to the method used in Garven and Lamm Tennant (2003) and Mayers 
and Smith (1990). Whereas the two previous studies use reinsurance premiums ceded to 
total business premiums as the measure of reinsurance demand, I am interested in the 
risk-taking activities of the firm and therefore use the measure of risk retained on the 
company’s books. In each case, total business is defined as direct premiums written plus 
reinsurance assumed as reported in each year’s NAIC statement. The variable is then 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the effect of outliers. Groups retain 
about 81% of their portfolio on average and 89% at the median, although there is 
significant variation. The three firms which retained none of their business were removed 
from the data set as they were likely experiencing abnormal business conditions and not 
representative of standard insurance companies. 
Premium-Surplus Ratio 
 Another decision which management can use to determine the firm’s exposure to 
bankruptcy is the amount of premiums written relative to the surplus that the firm retains. 
This measure can be interpreted in a way similar to the leverage of the firm when 
considering debt policy. If the firm incurs too many losses on its business and cannot 
cover them by collected premiums and surplus, or by raising new capital, then it will 
enter a state of financial distress. 
 The premium to surplus ratio measures the level of capital surplus relative to 
premiums. It is specifically calculated by the amount of direct premiums written divided 
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by surplus reported in the NAIC data. The variable was then winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. An insurance company must have an asset heavy balance sheet to pay out 
claims. Industry statutory surplus is the amount by which assets exceed liabilities. For 
instance: a ratio 0.95 -to 1 means that insurers are writing less than $1.00 worth of 
premium for every $1.00 of surplus. A ratio of 1.02-to-1 means insures are writing $1.02 
for every $1.00 in surplus. The average ratio is 321% or a ratio of 3.21. This represents a 
leverage of $3 of premiums for every $1 of surplus and the mean is affected by a few 
highly levered firms. The median ratio is 1.68.  
 The bankruptcy costs that a high ratio exposes the firm to should lead a more 
levered company to purchase more reinsurance. Reinsurance can serve as a substitute for 
capital in this way. Powell and Sommer (2007) find evidence that higher leverage leads 
to greater reinsurance purchase. Mayers and Smith (1987) explain that the investment 
incentive hypothesis predicts that a more levered firm will purchase more reinsurance as 
this can help to alleviate the costs of debt and allow greater use of tax shields. Holding 
other risk policies constant, a higher vega should be associated with a higher premium 
surplus ratio - the theoretical explanations go in the same direction.  
A.M. Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio 
 Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio is a percentage which measures a company's 
relative capital strength compared to its industry peer composite. A company's BCAR is 
an important component in determining its rating which is often used as a proxy for the 
risk of the firm. Capital adequacy ratios are calculated as the net required capital 
necessary to support components of underwriting, asset, and credit risks in relation to 
economic surplus. Required capital is based upon standard industry practice. The A.M. 
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Best dataset  provides a calculated ratio for each insurance company, but not for groups. 
To create my measure I create a weighted average of the ratios for all the constituent 
members of the group using each company’s assets as a weight. As before, this variable 
is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. This may yield a less naïve measurement of 
leverage than the simple premium/surplus ratio, as it takes into account the risks that the 
firm faces relative to the norm in the industry. I also check results using the provided 
minimum and maximum ratios for each company in an insurer group and find similar 
results. 
Business in Long-Tailed Lines 
 An alternative for the firm to increasing the size of its business relative to its 
surplus or the amount that is retained is for it to simply write more risky business. I 
control for this possibility by examining the amount of business that a firm writes in more 
risky lines compared with the effects on the above three variables. If a firm is retaining 
more risk and also writing more risky business then both sets of equations should see a 
positive coefficient on vega. If the firm is simply writing more risky business, i.e. it is 
responding by increasing its risk level but not necessarily in value-adding ways then the 
coefficient on long-tailed lines would be positive while that on the other three measures 
would be insignificant. 
 Long-tailed lines are defined in Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1996) and listed in 
Appendix 1. 61% of group business takes place in long lines and 86% of firms conduct at 
least some business in them. I check on the relative risk of long-tailed lines as well as 
property vs. liability lines in several ways. Table 3 shows several measures of the risk in 
every line – the standard deviation of gross losses, the contribution to the company’s risk 
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portfolio and the variance in the loss ratio. The rankings of the lines according to these 
measures gives an indication of the relative risk that they add to the firm. I also 
constructed the loss ratio for Schedule P versus non-Schedule P lines and property and 
liability lines separately. I examine the variance of the loss ratios to provide a measure of 
the relative predictability of losses in these lines, and hence, how much risk they create 
for the company. By testing the variances I am able to see if they are significantly 
different and if these definitions are actually suitable proxies for the risk a firm’s business 
creates. To eliminate doubtful outliers the Schedule P loss ratios were winsorized at the 
5% and 95% levels and the property/liability loss ratios were winsorized at the 1% and 
9% levels. Once this had been done, I could not reject the null hypothesis that the 
variance in loss ratios for Schedule P lines is the same as it is for non-Schedule P lines. 
The variance of the loss ratios in property lines is significantly greater than the loss ratio 
variance in liability lines, which goes against expectations and theory. This is due to a 
few companies on the very upper end of the property-line loss ratio distribution.  If the 
lines are winsorized at the 10% and 90% levels instead, then the variance of loss ratios 
for liability lines is higher than for property lines, although the difference is not 
significant in my sample. Still, I include the business conducted in long-tailed lines so 
that comparison may be drawn with theories and prior studies, as well as to control for 
the type of business which a firm conducts.
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3.3.2 Executive Incentive Variables 
Information on executive pay and characteristics were taken from the Execucomp 
database provided by COMPUSTAT. Executives in the insurance industry were 
identified by the SIC code of their company, limited to 6300-6500. They were then 
matched to companies in the NAIC data using the created merge-key described earlier. 
The incentives given to CEOs through stock and options are represented by two 
variables, measuring the change in an executive’s wealth to changes in company share 
price. Using available information and the estimation technique determined by Core and 
Guay (2002), the executive wealth sensitivity variables were created. Option values are 
calculated using the Black-Scholes option pricing formula and compare closely with 
those provided by COMPUSTAT. The estimation technique used is able to determine 
fairly accurate values for sensitivities even when all of the option information is not 
directly observable and compensates for the sometimes-limited information available 
through COMPUSTAT. To control for responsibilities being distributed throughout the 
upper-level management, these sensitivities were also calculated for the entire upper-
level management team at each company. 
Delta 
Delta is the sensitivity of CEO wealth to a one percent change in stock price and 
represents the alignment between the incentives of managers and those of stockholders 
(Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006). Figure 2 shows how this measure has increased over 
time as the use of options in executive compensation has become more popular. A larger 
delta increases the rewards from an increase in stock price as the managers now share in 
Jeremy Skog - 30 -  
the stockholder’s payoff – restricted stock increases delta linearly - so the executive 
should work more effectively and direct his effort more productively. Because his payout 
parallels that of equity-holders a manager should be relatively less concerned with 
bankruptcy risk and should desire to increase the company’s risk-taking. John and John 
(1993) show that a high delta may increase the management’s motivations to shift risk to 
policy-holders. However, an increase in delta also increases and executive’s expected 
wealth to a point further out on the manager’s utility curve. This leads the manager to be 
exposed to more risk and as their shareholdings are relatively undiversified compared to 
most equity holders, therefore they may also pass over some risky, but positive NPV, 
projects as demonstrated in Holmstrom (1979), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987),  
Murphy (1999), Smith and Stulz (1985), and Guay (1999). Thus, delta may exacerbate 
the underinvestment problem if insurers focus on safer but less-profitable lines. Mayers 
and Smith (1990) report finding that insurance companies with a less diverse ownership 
structure demand more reinsurance. This implies that companies with management 
whose wealth is more tied to the performance of the firm could lead their firm to 
purchase more reinsurance, to the extent that the risk-aversion argument holds in both 
cases. 
 An executive’s delta was created according to the estimation technique described 
in Core and Guay (2002). This estimation allows the use of standard Execucomp data, 
while achieving a very high reliability when compared to other means of determining 
executive wealth and sensitivities. Compared with all companies in the Compustat 
database reported in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), the average delta of insurance 
industry executives is higher, at 1,039 for a chief executive, as opposed to the previously-
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reported value of 600 for a CEO. The median value is 274, compared with a previous 
median of 172. This is a comparison that should be expected as financial companies often 
make higher use of options compensation than firms in other industries. My figure 
indicates that a 1% increase in stock price would increase the wealth of an average chief 
executive by $1 million  I examine the within-firm variance of delta to ensure that the 
data set has enough heterogeneity. I run a fixed-effect regression on delta with firm and 
year dummy variables. The within-firm standard deviation of the residuals is then 
calculated and found to be about $730,000. This is less than half of the overall value of 
$2 million, but it is evidence that companies are varying their executive incentives over 
the years examined in this study. 
 The CEO’s incentives are calculated at the end of each fiscal year based upon 
stock and option holdings as reported by Execucomp. The number of shares held by each 
executive is given by the Execucomp variable shrown according to the formula: 
max(0,shrown). Each share has a delta of one. The delta of an option is given by the 
Black-Scholes formula: 
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 δ is the continuously compounded expected dividend yield as given by 
bs_yield/100 based upon the company’s average dividend yield over the past three years. 
If missing, the previous value is used. 
 σ is the expected volatility of stock returns calculated over 60 months in decimal 
units and reported in the variable bs_volat. Again, if missing the previous value is used. 
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 Rf is the continuously compounded risk-free rate, available from 
http://mi.compustat.com.docs-mi.help/blk_schol.htm 
 S is the stock price at the end of the fiscal year, given by prccf. 
 K is the strike price of the option, given by expric. 
 T is the time to maturity of the option determined from the Execucomp variable 
exdate and the current year. Assumptions for missing data are explained below: 
 N(*) is the cumulative standard normal distribution. 
 Option holdings fall into one of three categories: new grants in each year, existing 
grants from prior years which cannot be exercised, and existing grants which can be 
exercised. Dividend yield, volatility, risk-free rate and end-of-year stock price are 
available for all option categories. Strike price and time-to maturity are available for new 
option grants. If the company made an options grant in the most recent fiscal year, then 
the time-to-maturity of unexercisable options is set to one year less than the most recent 
options grant and the time-to-maturity for exercisable options is four years less than the 
most recent options grant. Because K and T are not always available for existing options, 
I make certain assumptions based on the Core and Guay methodology. If there was no 
recent options grant then unexercisable options are assumed to have a time-to-maturity of 
nine years and exercisable options are assumed to have a time-to-maturity of six years. 
The minimum time-to-maturity is recoded to be three years for unexercisable options and 
one year for exercisable options as lesser values are likely to be miscoded. 
 CEOs may receive multiple grants in each year. I first calculate the delta of each 
grant, multiply it by the number of options in each grant (numsecur), and then sum all of 
the grants given to an executive in a specific year. This yields a variable (numnewop) 
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which is my calculation of the total number of new options granted in each year. 
Execucomp provides a variable (soptgrnt) which gives the number of options granted in 
each year but the values provided are not always the same as those obtained when 
summing across all grants for an executive. Using the ‘bottom-up’ approach is more 
internally consistent with the rest of the estimation of grant value and therefore it is the 
one which I employ. 
 The intrinsic value of new options granted in a year is calculated as: 
numsecur*K)-Smax(0,numsecur*expric))-(prccfmax(0,ivnew ==  
The intrinsic values of exercisable and unexercisable options are calculated in a similar 
manner. First, I need to determine an estimate of the average strike price, since this 
information is not directly available from Execucomp. For unexercisable options, the 
average strike price is assumed to be: 
numnewopuexnumun
ivnewinmonun
prccf
−
−
−  
 Inmonun is the intrinsic value of the unexercisable options held at the end of the 
year, some of which are from new option grants, as reported to Execucomp. Uexnumun is 
the reported number of such options. 
 Although most option grants are unexercisable, there are some circumstances 
where numnewop > uexnumum – the number of newly granted options exceeds the 
intrinsic year-end value of the unexercisable options. In this case, wealth is calculated 
assuming that some of the options are exercisable. The strike price for exercisable options 
is calculated as: 
)( uexnumunnumnewopuexnumex
inmonex
K new
−−
=  
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where the (numnewop-uexnumun) represents the portion of exercisable options due to 
new grants.  Inmonex is the reported intrinsic value of exercisable options held at year 
end and uexnumex is the number of these options. 
 There are several specific cases for exercisable options which are dealt with 
particularly. To handle outliers the maximum value of an option is recoded to be the year-
end value of the stock price – an option cannot be worth more than the underlying asset. 
There are also a number of cases where the number of newly granted options exceeds the 
number of total options at year end, i.e. numnewop > uexnumun + uexnumex. In these 
cases I assume that the options held at year end are entirely new grants and there were no 
previously granted options. There are also some cases where some of the newly granted 
options appear to be exercisable options with intrinsic value. These are identified when 
ivnew > inmonun and numnewop > uexnumun. For these values, the strike price of the 
exercisable options is calculated as 
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 Given these estimates of the strike prices and maturities of the outstanding option 
portfolios, it is possible to calculate the delta for total new grants, unexercisable options 
held and exercisable options held. These are then combined with the shares owned by the 
executive to give the formula for total delta: 
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Where the deltas are calculated according to the formula given above. 
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Vega 
Vega is the sensitivity of CEO wealth to a change in the volatility of the 
underlying stock, specifically to a .01 change in the annualized stock return volatility. 
Vega increases the convexity of the rewards to executives, and this convexity creates 
incentives for executives to take on more risk. The level of vega is generally determined 
by several structural factors, some of which are easily manipulable by the granting boards 
and others not. These include the time-to-maturity of the option, the dividend yield, the 
historic volatility of the company, the ratio of the current stock price to strike price, and 
the risk-free rate. The first-order effects are expected to be due to stock price relative to 
the exercise price and time to maturity. 
Capital structure theories of reinsurance purchase, as shown in Garven and Lamm 
Tennant (2003), predict that a higher vega should lead to less reinsurance purchased and 
more risk retained by the firm. Although Guay (1999) notes that the net effect of vega 
depends on the power of the payoff convexity to overcome the concavity of the 
managerial utility function, the convexity appears to override the concavity of the utility 
function in all empirical studies.  
 This has been shown empirically as Guay (1999) mentions “stock return volatility 
is positively related to the convexity provided to managers, suggesting convex incentive 
schemes influence investing and finance decisions.” Cohen, Hall and Viceira (2000), and 
Guay (1999) have shown a positive association between vega and stock return volatility 
and leverage using vega on the right-hand-side. When vega is the dependent variable 
there exists a positive correlation between vega and firm size, investment opportunities, 
and research and development expenditure (Guay, 1999). 
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 Like delta, vega is estimated using the method described in Core and Guay (2002) 
and the same assumptions described above in the creation of delta are used for numbers 
of options, strike price and time to maturity. Guay (1999) shows that option vega is many 
times higher than stock vega, allowing for the assumption that the vega of restricted stock 
is zero. The calculated vegas are summed across each of the categories of new grants, 
exercisable and unexercisable options to create the total vega. Vega for each is calculated 
according to the formula: 
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Again, compared with Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) who reported a mean value of 
80 and median of 46, the numbers are slightly higher. The average vega for an insurance 
CEO is 114, with a median value of 48. As with delta, a t-test confirms that CEOs have 
vegas which are significantly higher than other managers at a company. The fact that the 
means are so much higher than the medians shows that a few CEOs have contracts with 
significantly more incentive pay than the industry average and there is a long right tail in 
the pay distribution. Vega has increased over time, as shown in figure 2. As with delta, I 
examine the within-firm variance in vega by examining the residuals after a fixed effect 
regression controlled with firm and year dummies. The within-firm standard deviation of 
the residuals is found to be about $97,000, about half of the value before controlling for 
fixed effects. While firms obviously differ in their use of executive incentives, firms have 
enough heterogeneity over time to provide meaningful results on the effect of a policy 
change. 
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Figure 2 
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3.4 Other Insurance Company Variables 
 
 The control variables used in the regressions can be broadly separated into three 
categories: those related to structural reasons for managing risk, those related to the 
executive’s personal reasons for managing risk, and those which help address the issue of 
endogeneity in the equations. The structural variables are measures of the size of the firm, 
firm performance, risk-management skill, the riskiness of insurance claim losses, the 
riskiness of investment returns, the riskiness of revenue, the riskiness of insurance 
reserves, the average tax rate paid by the firm, the diversification of group business by 
line and geography, the diversification of the group’s ownership, the standard deviation 
of stock returns, and the A.M. Best rating of the group. The managerial control variables 
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are the level of cash compensation, the age of the executive, and the tenure at current 
company and as Chief Executive Officer. These are expected to be positively associated 
with reinsurance purchase. In the final group of control variables, which are sometimes 
included in panel regressions, are the predicted values of delta and vega given the other 
observables of the firm as well as the residuals. Twice-lagged values (t-2) are also 
included in some specifications to control for prior firm policy. 
 The size of the firm is likely to affect both the demand for reinsurance and the 
amount of compensation paid to the manager. Consistent with prior literature, firm size is 
defined as the logarithm of admitted assets and is positively related to risk retained, as 
shown in table 2. The size of the firm likely affects reinsurance demand through expected 
bankruptcy costs and tax burden, investment incentives, real-service efficiencies and 
economies of scale, since larger firms likely need to purchase proportionally less 
reinsurance to take advantage of a greater risk pool and may also experience some 
economies of scale in hedging (Fok, Carroll and Chiou (1997), Powell and Sommer 
(2007)). Additionally, expected bankruptcy costs are less than proportional to firm size, 
(Fok, Carroll and Chiu (1997), Warner (1977) Altman (1984)) so larger firms will have 
less probability of bankruptcy and gain less from reducing the effects of bankruptcy, 
giving them less reason to hedge. Mayers and Smith (1990), Powell and Sommer (2007) 
and Garven and Lamm Tennant (2003) find evidence of this effect. 
 Most insurance companies do not break even or make the majority of their profits 
on the premiums they charge, demonstrated by an average combined ratio of above 100 
in the data. Companies rely on investment earnings for profitability, taking advantage of 
both their investment skill and the time-lag between premium payments and loss 
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payments. Companies should retain more risk if their investment earnings are correlated 
with their losses and therefore provide a natural hedge. Rho is calculated from the losses 
by line and return by investment category for each observed year and line for a group, 
weighted by the proportion of investments and premiums. Rho is a measure of the overall 
risk of the portfolio of business that a company conducts, similar to that computed for 
assigning surplus in Myers and Read (2001). This measure accounts for the variances and 
covariances between the liability lines and assets of the firm. Rho is not strongly related 
to firm-observable results, although it is related to the incentives given to executives. 
The primary risk to an insurer is from claims due to losses and their variance may 
be very different depending on line and type of business written. The volatility of losses 
is calculated from a group’s observed loss history. I find that the riskiness of each 
company’s business has an insignificant effect on its demand for reinsurance. 
Earnings risk is calculated from the variance in investment and premium earnings. 
A low volatility in investment earnings reduces the risk that a company will have to cover 
losses out of its surplus and a company should attempt to offset high volatility by 
purchasing more reinsurance. Alternately, if the higher deviation of investment returns 
reflects a preference of the management for more risky activities, the risky investment 
decisions could imply less reinsurance. The net effect is theoretically uncertain, and I find 
that historical volatility in a group’s reported investment earning is related to more risk 
retention at the company, but not group, level. I use these variances in the comparison 
regressions where I attempt to see how similar my data set is to other studies in the field. 
In my own regressions I use the portion of a company’s investments in stock and bonds 
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as a measure of their investment risk as this information is available in all years of the 
study. This measure is obtained from the A.M. Best database. 
 The other portion of earnings volatility comes from the direct business written by 
a company. A large change in premium volatility could represent a company that is 
rapidly changing, either growing or shrinking in size or one that is entering a new line of 
business. While the loss volatility can measure that danger that a company is exposed to 
an unexpected loss, the historical premium volatility measures the steadiness of a group’s 
business model and can be compared to a group’s ‘tenure’ in a given industry. Fok, 
Carroll and Chiou (1997) note that firm’s with more volatile operating income are more 
likely to hedge in order to reduce their business risk.  I find mixed results, occasionally 
showing an insignificant relation between risk retained and premium volatility and 
occasionally a positive and significant one. These three volatility variables are constant 
over years for included firms, due to the method of their construction, so the variables are 
excluded from the fixed-effects regressions. 
 The average tax rate that a firm pays may provide incentives to purchase 
reinsurance because decreasing the proportion of assets in taxable investments provides 
valuable tax shields, but also increases the probability of insolvency as the firm becomes 
more levered. Simultaneously, since tax-favored assets likely yield lower returns than 
taxable ones, the firm lowers its potential investment returns and it therefore faces greater 
risk of paying out of its reserves. Because of these two effects, a firm should retain more 
risk if it pays a higher tax rate and purchase more reinsurance as its proportion of tax-
favored assets increases. A firm’s average tax rate is calculated from the average tax paid 
on investments and a higher tax rate is associated with more risk retained. Tax rates may 
Jeremy Skog - 41 -  
vary greatly due to accounting carry-backs and carry-forwards, hence the wide variance 
observed in the data set. 
 By diversifying across several lines of business a company can help to protect 
itself from large, idiosyncratic shocks and avoid bankruptcy costs. The business 
concentration of an insurance company is measured by its herfindahl index across its 
lines of business which measures the exposure to a given line. The net effect of business 
concentration is ambiguous as there are several ways in which concentration can affect 
reinsurance demand. Real-service efficiencies have a direct effect as the less concentrated 
an insurer’s business is, the more valuable the rating function of the reinsurer will be 
(Mayers and Smith, 1990). Diversification may act as a substitute for reinsurance, leading 
to less demand. However, a company could specialize in a low-volatility line of business 
which would decrease its demand for reinsurance or choose less risky insureds within 
those lines (Powell and Sommer, 2007). I do not find any evidence that companies target 
their risk-retention on specific lines of business. The herfindahl index is calculated by the 
direct premiums written in each line for a group and is found to be positively associated 
with risk retention, implying that the diversification effect is more pronounced than the 
possibility of specializing in low-volatility lines. 
Group concentration measures to what extent an insurance group is split between 
different companies. A group with many large companies would be quite diverse while a 
company which has only one large lead company and a few smaller subsidiaries would be 
less diverse. The diversity of a group is likely to play a role in reinsurance demand 
because of the diversification effect that limited liability grants to insurance companies, 
which may limit bankruptcy costs. If a subsidiary suffers excessive losses, the lead 
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company has the valuable option to declare bankruptcy, shielding the rest of the 
insurance group from the shock. This is desirable as owning a portfolio of options is 
worth more to an investor than owning an option on a portfolio. The group concentration 
Herfindahl is constructed by aggregating the direct premiums written for each company 
within an insurance group. I do not find a significant relationship between group 
diversification and reinsurance purchase. 
Diversification effects also affect risk management through geographic 
diversification. The most basic measurement technique is simply to use the number of 
states in which a firm is licensed to sell insurance. This is the technique used in Mayers 
and Smith (1990) and Garven and Lamm Tennant (2003). The valid regions for business 
include the 50 states, the District of Columbia and four territories. The maximum number 
of geographic regions is 55. 
Mayers and Smith (1990) identify three ways in which geographic concentration 
can affect demand for reinsurance. 1) By increasing the volatility of taxable income, the 
tax savings through reinsurance are increased. 2) The volatility of the value of the firm is 
increased and so the expected bankruptcy costs and investment incentives for reinsurance 
are increased. 3) The value of real services provided by the insurer is increased with 
specialization and therefore the demand for reinsurance should decline. The net effect is 
therefore ambiguous, as the tax, bankruptcy, and investment incentives effects imply 
increased demand while the real-service efficiencies argument implies less demand. 
A more-diversified firm is also less likely to be exposed to catastrophic losses 
(Powell and Sommer, 2007), because this effect is likely to be more important in some 
lines than others this is unlikely to be a major causal variable for most insurance 
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companies. A larger firm is more likely to be licensed in more states so this variable 
captures the effect of a large firm which is located within only one state versus a large 
firm which is spread over many states. I find little actual effect for geographic 
diversification among insurance groups. The states-licensed variable is negative and 
significant when examining at the company-level but not at the group level. The 
geographic herfindahl index, which measures diversification of premiums written by state 
is significantly negative for both companies and groups. 
 The A.M. Best rating describes the default probability for an insurance firm. This 
default risk affects reinsurance demand through the bankruptcy cost and investment 
incentive channels. Both channels imply that a riskier firm should purchase more 
reinsurance, although I find no significant effect. For groups, the A.M. Best rating of the 
largest corporation in the group in a given year is used. 
 To account for supply effects in the insurance market within a given year and 
market performance, yearly dummy variables are included. This study covers both 
periods of hard and soft-markets in the insurance industry. There are many years with 
significant negative effects, controlling, for example for the pricing shocks on 
reinsurance after the terrorist attacks in 2001. It is particularly necessary to account for 
year-by-year differences because of the long time series used in this study. The base year 
(t=1) is 1992.  
 Firm performance is measured by the total return to shareholders, obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. As in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) it is included as a control 
variable to capture the general quality of a company’s business and the environment it is 
operating in. This measure of firm performance is included because it is the one which is 
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most directly affected by equity compensation of managers. If equity compensation does 
bring the interests of management in line with those of shareholders, then the focus of 
management should be on increasing this return, the one which would benefit the 
managers-as-owners the most. These returns vary from -73% to +121% in the short-term 
1-year data. A drawback to this measure is that it is affected by noise and general market 
trends – and thus may not give an entirely clear picture of the actions of management. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) note that monitoring of managers is more difficult in markets 
with more variance or returns and more noise. The more noise there is, the greater the 
cost of obtaining information on managerial performance and the less information which 
is available. Also, if managers are behaving optimally, then there is relatively more noise 
to information on managerial performance – the random effects of the market have a 
greater effect if managers have already maximized firm value as much as they are able to 
through their decisions. 
 I use growth in premiums as a control to measure the business environment of the 
firm and its need for proper risk management. A firm can grow quickly by taking on 
more business but may also find it more difficult to assess the risk. Generally, a new 
account will have more unknowns than a long-established one and the company may not 
yet have expertise in pricing idiosyncratic properties. Thus a large growth in premiums 
may generate demand for safer risk-decisions. If firms are drawing in more customers 
because they are viewed as able to better assess risk and offer a fairer price or because 
they are better managed than their competitors then a growth in premiums represents a 
gain in firm value. However, if an increase in premiums is due to the firm taking on 
customers which they otherwise would not have - worse market risks – then an increase 
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in premiums may not represent an increase in firm value. The growth in premiums is 
calculated as the change in direct premiums written as reported to the NAIC by each 
company. Total premiums written for each year are calculated by summing across all of 
the companies owned by each insurance group. 
 The loss ratio measures how risky an insurer’s book of business is. It is calculated 
by dividing losses and loss adjustments expenses by premiums earned. This control 
variable gives a broad measure as to how good of a job a company does at assessing risk 
and charging proper premiums. The loss ratio shows what percentage of payouts are 
being settled with recipients. The lower the loss ratio the better – a firm with a low loss 
ratio appears to be good at assessing its business risk and may be ale to make riskier 
decisions when concerning bankruptcy risk. Higher loss ratios may indicate that an 
insurance company may need better risk management policies to guard against future 
possible insurance payouts. A high ratio may also occur because of an idiosyncratic 
shock which results in an abnormally high number of claims. If this is an industry-wide 
effect however, then the use of year dummies should control for this potential source of 
error. 
3.5 Executive Demographic Variables 
 The chief executive at each company was determined mainly by the Execucomp 
CEO flag which I corrected according to the date on when an executive became CEO. If 
a company switched CEOs midyear both executives were flagged as being the CEO for 
that year. If no executive was listed for a company, then the highest-paid executive was 
identified as the CEO. In 23 cases two executives were listed as CEO for a given 
company in the same year. In these cases the one who held the office at the end of the 
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year was retained as his policies were more likely to be in place at the end of the year – 
when the variables were recorded. This allows the panel to be identified by firms in a 
given year, rather than by executives. 
 I examined the employment horizon of each executive by using the age of the 
executive. Employment horizon may particularly play a role as the executive nears 
retirement and wants to secure any promised retirement package. As this date draws 
closer, the executive will likely be willing to retain less risk to ensure he maintains his 
position and the company remains in business. Tufano (1996) notes that in this context 
managerial age may serve as a proxy for risk aversion, although he does not find 
significant results. 
 The length of time which an executive has served as CEO may play an important 
role for several reasons. If the executive is more familiar with the business then he may 
be able to better the firm’s productivity. However if tenure is a proxy for managerial 
power over the board of directors then the executive may direct his power towards 
activities that enrich him personally but do not create firm value. Fok, Carroll, and Chiou 
(1997) find a negative relationship between managerial entrenchment and corporate 
hedging, implying that firms where managers are more entrenched are more likely to bear 
risk, which they explain as evidence of perk consumption: entrenched managers are still 
not acting in shareholder’s interests by not hedging. Chakraborty, Sheikh, and 
Subramanian (2007) provide evidence that managers who face high termination risk are 
more likely to make low-volatility investments than those who do not face such risk of 
losing their jobs. This implies that entrenched managers would make more risky 
investments than those who are less entrenched. I constructed this variable using the year 
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in which the executive joined the company subtracted from the observation year in the 
data set. 
 The length of time a CEO has spent at his company may be another measure of 
how entrenched he his and how well he performs at the business, separate from his role 
as CEO. This is strictly a measure of an executive’s length of association with a company 
and may be longer, in some cases much longer, than the tenure as CEO. A manager who 
is well entrenched is more likely to desire to maintain his position and purchases more 
reinsurance. Tufano (1996) notes that a manager with less tenure may be more likely to 
engage in risk management practices and finds evidence of this result. However, since 
reinsurance is well-known in the insurance industry, this sort of effect is less prevalent 
here. It may also be a measure of how well he knows the business of the company and 
therefore the size of the real-service efficiencies the company is able to provide, which 
would lead to less reinsurance purchase. These effects go in opposite directions so the net 
effect of tenure needs to be determined empirically. 
 I created missing dummies to control for missing observations without reducing 
the sample size. These dummy variables allow observations to be included in the analysis 
while still recognizing that they are different from observations for which we have 
complete information. The missing dummy is coded as one if the observation was 
missing and zero otherwise. After the dummy is created the initial observation is recoded 
as zero and included in the regression. This has the effect of counting the observation as 
the mean value of the variable and leaves an OLS regression unbiased. Missing dummy 
variables were created for age, tenure as CEO, tenure at company, stock returns, loss 
ratio, proportion of risky investments, and growth in premiums. 
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4. Empirical Setup 
 
 This section covers the empirical methodology used in this study. First, I describe 
the panel least-squares and instrumental variable regressions used to investigate the 
relationship between executive incentives and risk-management decisions, along with the 
regressions to create predicted variables. Then I identify the systems of simultaneous 
equations used for investigating the possibility that many of the variables are co-
determined. Section six explains robustness checks, along with their results. 
4.1 Incentives and Risk Management 
4.1.1 Panel Regressions 
 I am ultimately interested in determining the effect that delta and vega have on the 
risk decision variables. With the panel data I have, the most general empirical 
specification is the fixed-effects regression: 
Equation 2 
tiittititi YR ,1,31,1, εηδβυβ ++++= −−  
which simply examines the effect on the risk decision, observed at the end of year t of the 
managerial incentives in effect at the beginning of year t. An individual insurer group is 
denoted by i. This fixed effects regressions also controls for unobservable firm effects 
which are constant over time – such as preferences of ingrained habits on risk policy or a 
history of conducting certain business – and potentially correlated with other independent 
variables in the regression. This regression is presented in column 1 of tables 6-9. It is 
then expanded by adding the control variables discussed in section 3, which yields 
equation 3, displayed in column 2 of those same tables: 
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Equation 3: 
tiittititititi YCXR ,,41,31,2,1, εηβδβυββ ++++++= −−  
I run this equation for each of the risk-decision variables, represented by R: risk-
retained, proportion of business in schedule P lines, the Premium/Surplus ratio and the 
A.M. Best Capital Adequacy ratio. X represents the control variables determined by prior 
literature to affect reinsurance purchase and described in section 3. The structural 
controls are the size of the firm, the premium-surplus ratio, the correlation between 
investment returns and claims, the average tax rate paid by the firm, the diversification of 
group business by line and geography, the diversification of the group’s ownership, 
growth in premiums, loss ratio, proportion of assets in stocks and bonds, shareholder 
return and the A.M. Best rating of the group. Managerial control variables include the age 
of the executive, as well as his tenure as a chief executive and at a particular company, as 
well as missing dummies to control for missing variables. The executive’s incentives are 
given by δ (delta) and υ (vega), whereas the cash value of a compensation package is 
represented by C, which I use to help control for managerial risk aversion. Y are the year 
dummies for each year in the study, except the first year, 1992. η represents fixed effects 
for a specific company, and ε is a idiosyncratic error for each individual at each time.  
I assume that target values for the risk-decision are set by the executive and 
adjusted throughout the year, according to market conditions, so I include 
contemporaneous values of the control variables. Cash compensation is assumed to be 
guaranteed, so the contemporaneous value is used. Because incentive variables are 
calculated using year-end figures, the current year incentives known to the chief 
executive are those which exist at the and of the previous year. Thus, lagged values of 
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incentive variables are used in the equations. The contemporaneous relationship between 
the risk-decision and incentive variables is investigated using a system of simultaneous 
equations, described below. 
By using fixed-effects regressions on panel data, I am able to control for firm and 
executive specific idiosyncrasies that may be persistent over time. Employing the fixed-
effect regressions has a similar effect to de-meaning the data to account for unobserved 
variables which are constant over time, but vary between firms – the error structure 
which best describes unobserved variables due to risk policy preferences or a history of 
conducting particular business. It is likely that some executives internally prefer more 
risk than others for reasons that are not directly observable. Similarly, some firms may 
have a culture of bearing more risk than others. The fixed-effects specifications accounts 
for the fact that these preferences may be correlated with observed variables. Industry-
wide effects that occur in only a single year are controlled for using the year dummies, 
allowing me to concentrate on individual observation fixed-effects. 
 The fixed-effect regressions are then expanded as: 
Equation 4: 
tiittititititi YCXR ,1,41,3,2,1, εηδβυβββ ++++++= −−
))
 
and  
Equation 5 
tiitresidtiresidtitititititi YCXR ,,1,6,1,51,41,3,2,1, εηδβυβδβυβββ ++++++++= −−−−
))))
 
which incorporate the predicted lagged values of delta and vega as well as the residuals in 
equation 5, denoted by hats: ^. 
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 Here, several additional variables are included in an attempt to control for a firm’s 
natural or desired level of vega and deviations form it. This allows me to examine if 
variation in incentives from past policy and structural preference, represented by 
^
υ   and 
^
δ , or the predicted values of vega and delta affect risk bearing. Deviations from this 
value are given by the residuals in the equations, which capture the effect of the portion 
of incentives which are orthogonal to all of the other control variables. Thus, it is possible 
to investigate how much of the risk decision is due to what would be natural for the firm 
and how much is due to variations in the incentives given to management. The predicted 
values are determined by the regressions: 
Equation 6: 
residtittiti YX ,,,1, υβυ
))
++=  
and 
Equation 7: 
 
 
where X represents the current managerial and structural control variables as explained 
before. The control variables are contemporaneous with the vales of delta and vega, one 
year before the control variables used in equation 4, which are contemporaneous with the 
risk decision. Y is a control variable for all of the years appearing in the study. These 
expressions yield what the industry-standard value of delta or vega would be, given the 
particular observable details of a firm, and results are presented in table 4. By controlling 
for this, I can compensate for whether expected values of incentives have effects on risk 
decisions. In addition, in equation 5, the coefficients on residual delta and vega can 
residtittiti YX ,,,1, δβδ
))
++=
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determine if providing greater or fewer incentives has the effect of being able to induce 
behavior by differing from the ‘expected’ incentives. 
 I also examine the role of managerial power on risk decisions in some of the 
specifications. Managers who are more entrenched in their firm are likely better able to 
dictate the terms of their contract to extract more compensation from a willing board and 
should also be positioned to make safer risk-decisions to protect their position. To test 
this I predict how much an executive should be paid given the structure of an insurance 
firm and the demographics of the executive. The difference between this predicted value 
and the actual level of pay could be considered a proxy of the power of the manager. This 
relationship is estimated using the following equation: 
Equation 8 
iii XPay εβα ++= 1  
 Pay is measured using Compustat’s TDC1 variable which measures the pay 
granted to the executive by the board. X is the entire set of firm structural and managerial 
characteristic variables described previously. The residual, PayResid, is then calculated 
using the predicted coefficients. This regression is also presented in table 4, described in 
section 5. 
4.1.2 Instrumental Variable Regressions 
 I attempt to resolve the problem of potential endogeneity due to simultaneous 
determination of the risk and compensation structure choices by conducting several 
instrumental variable regressions with a form similar to that of the panel regressions. 
Four different specifications are presented below. The first, in column 5 of tables 6-9, 
includes only the incentives with the twice-lagged value of vega used to instrument the 
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lagged value of vega. Next, control variables are added. The third specification uses the 
twice-lagged predicted value of vega to instrument lagged vega. It is possible that the 
incentive variables at the beginning of a year are correlated with the idiosyncratic error in 
the risk-decision regression for that year. However, it is less likely that the incentives 
from two years ago are associated with this error, making the twice-lagged variables a 
potential instrument. There is consistency in incentive variables over time. The 
correlation coefficient between vega at t and t-1 is 0.84, while that for delta is 0.96. I also 
use the t-2 predicted values as an instrument in column 7 to attempt to capture the effects 
of firm policies and make the instrumental variable regressions as directly comparable to 
the least-squares fixed-effect panel regressions as possible. All instrumental regressions 
are run taking into account panel fixed effects. Because these instrumental variable 
regressions control for potential endogeneity better than the panel regressions and these 
best fit the likely story of managerial incentives, the results in column 6, using twice-
lagged values of vega and control variables are the preferred results in this paper. The 
correlation matrix among all main variables in this study is given in appendix 3. 
4.1.3 Simultaneous Equations 
 It is likely that the level of risk that the firm bears, or the level that is preferred by 
boards of directors, is determined at the same time as the pay package offered to the 
CEO. If directors are using incentives to attempt to alter risk policy in a systematic way 
then delta and vega should be related to the risk decisions. If they are unrelated then this 
could mean that boards are no looking at current policy when setting compensation or 
that compensation is already set optimally. I examine this situation for the risk-retention 
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decision using the system of equations displayed in equation nine with results given in 
table 9. 
Equation 9 
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here, contemporaneous variables are used, in accordance with the assumptions of 
simultaneous equations. The measures of risk decisions are included in the incentive 
equations. Previously used variables are as described before. payresid is the residual of 
predicted pay level. trs is the total return to shareholders. firmrisk is the standard 
deviation of stock returns, which measures the ‘noise’ of the market that the firm is 
operating in and the potential usefulness of incentive pay. GPW is the growth in 
premiums written, schedP is the proportion of firm business which takes place in long-
tailed lines. Variables are included according to prior simultaneous equations literature 
which examines incentives and the risk-management decision. Schedule P, or long-tailed 
lines are included as part of the identification restrictions for the incentive equations, 
because this is another choice through which incentives could affect firm risk decisions – 
I examine the co-determination of business in long-tailed lines and incentives variables 
next. 
 A similar set of equations is estimated for the amount of business in schedule P 
lines described in equation 10. 
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 Each of the control variables is defined as above, but here the risk-retention 
decision is included to help identify the incentive equations, along with lagged incentive 
values, because this is an alternate decision that could be made by managers to increase 
or reduce risk. 
 Next, each measure of leverage: the Premium/Surplus ratio and Best’s Capital 
Adequacy Ratio, is estimated using a similar system, described in equation 11. 
Equation 11 
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 This system is much the same as the two before, however the leverage decision is 
now assumed to be made while incentives are set, taking into account the firm’s business 
and risk-retention decision, in a manner similar to Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). 
4.2 Relationship with Stock Return Variance 
 For executives to consider incentives when determining firm decisions, it is 
necessary that those decisions should have an effect on the stock variance – the 
underlying measure upon which the incentives are based. To see if the risk decision 
variables are actually related to the risk of the firm which affects vega, I regress each 
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measure upon the variance of stock returns on the market. To compensate for the fact that 
each variable may take some time to take effect, I include both contemporaneous and 
lagged values of each of the risk variables in the right-hand-side of the equations, along 
with the standard variables which should affect the risk of firm returns. 
Equation 12 
ititititii eaYXRRRRRRsdrets ++++++= −− 2,1,,ln  
 
 In these standard OLS regressions, X, is the observable set of control variables 
which is included to compensate for other factors which investors may take into account 
when determining firm value and the benefit of firm decisions. Y is the set of year 
dummies which account for returns in any specific year, while e is the idiosyncratic error 
and a is a constant term. This equation is estimated both with and without the twice-
lagged term and results are given in table 14. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Creation of Predicted Variables 
 For the panel and instrumental variable regressions, predicted values of 
managerial pay, risk retention, delta, and vega were created as described in section 4. The 
results are presented in Table 4. Several of the control variables were found to be 
important in determining the level of these variables. 
 The residual of managerial pay is used as a proxy measure for the manager’s clout 
within the firm’s management structure. As is consistent with the literature, larger firms 
pay more and managers who have been CEO longer receive more pay. After his has been 
controlled for, older executives receive less pay than expected. Several of the year 
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dummy variables are significant – there do appear to be broad effects in the market for 
executive talent over time. This regression broadly confirms the usual results from the 
managerial pay literature. 
 Delta is related to the length of time an executive has worked – how long they 
have had to build up a portfolio of options and stock. Both length of tenure as CEO and 
tenure at the company are positive and significant as CEOs are usually awarded more 
options per year than other managers. All of the firm variables are insignificant. In 
contrast, some of the firm-structure variables do seem to be important when determining 
the executive’s vega. The tenure variables are still significant, and tenure at company has 
a negative effect. Executives at larger firms also have higher sensitivities of wealth to 
stock variance. Executives at firms with concentrated business have higher sensitivities 
while those at firms whose business is uncorrelated with losses – those which do not have 
as much of a natural hedge – have lower sensitivies. Executives at better-rated firms also 
have higher sensitivities to firm stock-price variance. 
 As shown in the comparison regressions discussed in section 4, many of the 
structural variables have an effect on a group’s risk retention. Older CEOs tend to take 
riskier actions while those who have been a CEO for longer, and are presumably more 
entrenched, take less risky actions. As expected, larger firms bear more risk. Finally, 
groups with worse AM Best ratings are also those who bear more risk, suggesting that the 
company penalizes firms for excessive risk-bearing.
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5.2 Panel and IV Regressions 
 Panel and instrumental variable regressions are the preferred specifications in this 
paper and are presented in tables 6-9, all of which share the same basic structure. Table 5 
provides summary results from the preferred regressions in this study. Delta is found to 
be associated with less-risky decisions while the results from vega are mixed. The only 
result significant at the 10% level is that a higher vega is associated with less business in 
long-tailed lines. The regression results are explained in the particular subsections below. 
In each table, least-squares panel regressions are shown in section A (Columns 1-4) and 
the instrumental variable regressions are shown in section B (Columns 5-7). The equation 
in column 1 only the incentive variables are regressed on the risk decision variable. 
Column 2 adds control variables to examine the relative importance of managerial 
incentives. Column 3 uses predicted values of delta and vega to analyze the general effect 
of expected firm policy and correct for endogeneity. Column 4 includes residuals for 
delta and vega to determine the effect of the part of the sensitivity which is orthogonal to 
its predictor control variables – deviations from expected policy. The instrumental 
variables follow similar specifications using twice-lagged values of the sensitivity 
variables as instruments for the once-lagged variables included in the normal 
specification. Column 6 performs this same regression with control variables. Columns 7 
uses the twice-lagged predicted values as an instrument. 
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Table 5: Summary IV Results 
Risk Measure Delta Vega 
Risk Retained 0.14 8.402 
Proportion of Business in 
Long-Tailed Lines 
-1.357 -24.303* 
Premium/Surplus Ratio -19.535 153.145 
Best’s Capital Adequacy 
Ratio 
-5.277 -74.703 
* indicates significane at the 10% level. Risk measure and incentives are described in 
section 4. 
5.2.1 Risk Retained 
 The fixed-effects regressions on risk retained reveal a role for executive 
incentives in determining risk policy. The sign on delta is negative and insignificant in 
the first four specifications. However, the delta residuals are significant, indicating that 
an increase in delta from expected values is correlated with more risk-bearing. Vega is 
positive and significant in column one, as expected. When control variables are included, 
the coefficient is still positive, but no longer significant. The coefficient on predicted 
Vega is positive and significant in both of the specifications, although residuals appear to 
have no effect. These results indicate that increasing an executive’s wealth sensitivity to 
volatility at the beginning of a year does in fact encourage companies to purchase less 
reinsurance throughout the ensuing business year. 
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 When considering other control variables, cash compensation is negative, but 
insignificant. Older CEOs, a natural hedge, and firm business concentration all are 
associated with more risk retention in the incentives and control equation. In the 
predicted and residuals equation groups which are more concentrated retain more risk. 
Again, these firms appear to be taking on more risky policies, rather than using 
reinsurance as a way to reduce risk. 
 The instrumental variable regressions show that the incentives have the proper 
sign, although they are not significant. Further, delta is positive when lagged predicted 
values are used as instruments rather than actual values. Firm structure variables appear 
to be more significant in these regressions. Cash compensation is positively associated 
with risk retention, which is unexpected. As in the panel regressions older CEOs keep on 
more risk. More natural hedging, provided by a higher correlation of claims and losses, 
leads to more risk retention, as expected. More concentrated firms appear to retain more 
risk, which indicates general risk-bearing preferences.
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5.2.2 Proportion of Business in Long-Tailed Lines 
 There is evidence that executives are responding to incentives on the decision of 
how much business to conduct in risky lines, although their actions are the opposite of 
what would be expected. Incentives are insignificant in columns 1 and 2. When predicted 
values are used then delta is positive, indicating that executives are taking on business 
that they might otherwise have passed by, but predicted vega is negative and significant 
and remains so when residuals are included. This result implies that executives are 
actually taking on less risky business when they are given incentives to take on risk – a 
counterintuitive result. This same result occurs in columns 6 and 7 of the instrumental 
variable regressions. While delta has a negative effect in the instrumental variable 
regressions using predicted variables. 
 Again, several of the firm and structural variables are significant. Lower 
correlations between investment returns and claims costs are associated with more long-
tailed line business – these Schedule P lines do seem to add more risk to the company’s 
profile and do not provide a natural hedge. Firms which are more diversified in their 
business conduct less business in long-tailed lines, as we would expect. These risky lines 
seem to be the business of some specialty firms as other results suggest. Instrumental 
variables suggest that companies which are more concentrated in their group ownership 
conduct more of this risky business, which is what would be expected if these lines are 
the specialty of a few companies. Instrumental variable results, as well as those from 
panel regressions using predicted values indicate that companies which are less 
geographically diversified also conduct more business in these risky lines. CEOs who 
have been in their position longer appear to conduct more business in these risky lines. 
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Older CEOs do as well, only the regression using predicted and residual values gives the 
opposite result. The only significant results for tenure at a particular company come from 
using predicted values and indicate that executives who have longer tenure appear to 
conduct less business in these lines. CEOs who are brought in from outside may be more 
willing to expand into this business or may have specialized skills or preferences which 
leads them to pursue these lines.  
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5.2.3 Leverage: Premium/Surplus Ratio 
 Executives do not appear to be responding to incentives when determining 
leverage, at least as measured by the premium/surplus ratio. Both the delta and vega 
coefficients are negative, though insignificant, in the panel regression. The predicted 
values of vega are both positive, but again, insignificant. The residual of delta has a 
negative effect on leverage and is significant at the 10% level. The coefficient values for 
the instrumental variable regressions go in the expected direction, but these values are not 
statistically significant. 
 Some of the structural control variables do appear to be positively related to the 
leverage of the firm. The loss ratio is uniformly positive and significant – firms which 
take on more business appear to experience greater losses relative to the premiums they 
earn. It is possible that this is because they are taking on riskier business that they might 
otherwise pass over, rather than recruiting new business with the same risk profile. The 
number of states in which a firm does business is also uniformly related to more 
premiums for a given level of surplus. Perhaps state-level subsidiaries provide 
bankruptcy protection which offsets the affect of increased leverage for the group as a 
whole. When considering incentive and control variables firms which are more 
specialized in their business are also more leveraged – considering that firms which are 
more specialized also retain more risk then it is possible that these firms are making 
riskier decisions when they specialize in a particular line of business. I investigate 
whether firms are specializing in particularly risky lines of business in 5.2.2 and also in 
the robustness checks section of this paper. A higher tax rate is associated with less 
leverage as is more investment in risky assets. This is evidnce that firms who write more 
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premiums seem to be less concerned with potential tax shields and perhaps are using 
these extra premiums to attempt to earn higher yields on their invested assets.
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5.2.4 Leverage: Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio 
 
 Another leverage decision faced by the firm is that of setting policies to determine 
Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio. There is little evidence that incentive variables play a role 
in this decision, as none of the incentive variables are significant. Furthermore, in all of 
the regressions except for the incentives-only fixed effects regression, vega has a 
negative coefficient. These signs are the same for delta. The residual for delta is positive 
and significant at the 5% level, the only significant incentive result. Best’s Capital 
Adequacy Ratio does not seem to be a major target of managers. 
 Only a few structural variables are significant. As is expected, firms with a better 
AM best rating have a better, higher ratio. Interestingly, firms with more concentrated 
ownership also have a better adequacy ratio. Firms with more investments in stocks and 
bonds have higher ratios. 
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5.3 Simultaneous Equation Regressions 
 The relationship between incentives and firm decisions was also investigated in a 
simultaneous-equations framework to test the possibility that the contemporaneous levels 
of delta and vega were made at the same time as the firm’s risk decision. Because grants 
of options are made throughout the year and firms continually adjust their business 
decisions, treating these variables as uncorrelated and static may not capture their true 
structure. Simultaneous equations adjust the error structure of the regressions to account 
for this possible co-determination. I first examine the firm’s reinsurance purchase 
decision and its business in risky lines. Then, taking these decisions into account, I 
examine the firm’s leverage decision. The results are presented in tables 10-13. Each 
table has a similar structure, adjusted for the specifications of each regression. The 
endogenous variable three-stage-least-squares regressions are presented in columns 1-3. 
The first-stage regressions are presented in columns 4-6 so that the determinants of each 
of the endogenous variables can be seen. 
5.3.1 Risk Retained 
 In the simultaneous equations, incentives do not appear to play a large role in 
determining a company’s risk retention – delta is negative and significant at the 10% 
level but vega is insignificant. Both of the incentive variables are strongly correlated with 
their past values. Firms which pay more in cash also appear to pay compensation with 
higher levels of vega, perhaps in an effort to combat the risk-aversion effects of higher 
cash payments. Higher cash pay is associated with less risk retention, indicating that this 
could be the case. If boards are setting the optimal level of risk and managers are 
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responding, then it could be the case that the variables offset each other to produce result 
shareholders desire. Older CEOs tend to make riskier decisions, although those who have 
been in their jobs longer do not. They do, however, have higher sensitivity to stock price 
changes, likely from a build-up of options in their wealth portfolio. Larger firms retain 
more risk, as do those who pay more taxes. Firms which undertake riskier investments 
also retain more risk – indicating that risk decisions may be made across-the-board. Many 
of the structural variables are significant in the first-stage regressions. Notably firms 
which display a larger growth in premiums have higher vega in their pay packages and 
firms which do more business in long-tailed lines also retain more risk – perhaps firms 
are taking on or retaining more risky business than they would otherwise. This does not 
seem to be associated with loss ratio – that may play less of a role in the decision of how 
much to reinsure than in what to reinsure or how much leverage to bear. 
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5.3.2 Business in Long-Tailed Lines 
 The simultaneous equation regressions show that the contemporaneous incentives 
given to executives do not appear to have much effect on the amount of business in 
conducted in long-tailed lines. Here, firms which are less concentrated in their business 
conduct more business in these lines. These lines of business are also associated with less 
correlation with investment and natural hedging and greater variance of losses – the lines 
to appear to be more risky but the two effects might cancel each other out.
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5.3.3 Leverage: Premium/Surplus Ratio 
 Premium/Surplus ratio is not significantly related to an executive’s incentives. 
Executives who are paid more than expected take on more leverage although executives 
which are paid more in general take on less leverage – the executives who exceed their 
expected pay could be being compensated for the high risk of their particular companies 
or might have special skills in working at highly levered companies. As expected, the 
coefficient on vega is positive, although not significant. It does not appear that executives 
are affecting the firm risk through leverage in the way that they are with reinsurance. The 
two are negatively correlated, so reinsurance is a substitute for leverage although the 
relationship is not significant. Also, companies with more assets in stocks and bonds are 
taking on less leverage through writing more premiums relative to surplus. Older 
executives appear to make less risky decisions. The other structural variables are not 
related to the leverage decision in a meaningful way.
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5.3.4 Leverage: Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio 
 Incentives do have some effect on the capital adequacy ratio, but as with the panel 
direction they go in the opposite direction as theory predicts. A higher Vega appears to 
increase the capital adequacy ratio of firms, so firms where executives have more 
incentive to take risk are actually holding more risk-adjusted capital relative to their 
business, a counterintuitive result. This may imply that either managers are not 
responding to their incentives or that tying their wealth more closely to firm performance 
actually discourages risky actions. Of course, because Best’s Adequacy ratio is dependent 
on the particular business of firms, it could be that manager s are making less risky 
decisions but are focusing more on risk-management policy and this increased focus 
results in a higher ratio, while not showing up in the more naïve measurement of leverage 
that the premium/surplus ratio represents. Firms where managers have more control have 
a lower adequacy ratio, although managers should use their power to make safer 
decisions. At the same time firms which pay more cash compensation have a higher ratio, 
as well as higher sensitivity of wealth to variance. Companies which retain more risk 
have a higher ratio. Most of the results for this simultaneous equation system go in the 
opposite direction of what should be expected – managers who should be making riskier 
decisions also appear to be taking on less leverage compared with their risk profile and 
peers. 
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5.4 Firm Decision Effects on Stock-Return Volatility 
 
 For compensation incentives to be effective at altering executive behavior it is 
necessary that the managerial decision variables have an effect on the market 
measurements to which the incentives are tied – stock price and volatility. I regress 
several lagged values of each risk measure on the log of the standard deviation of daily 
stock returns and present the results in table 12. The lagged and twice-lagged values of 
business in long-tailed lines are the only variables significantly associated with risk 
policy and they do appear to increase the variance of stock returns – these lines are 
actually more risky when it comes to the market’s judgment of firm performance. 
Because the measure is the log of a value between zero and one, the negative sign is 
actually associated with greater volatility of stock returns. Most of the lagged values have 
this sign, except for risk retained in the once-lagged specification, although the results are 
not significant at the ten-percent level. Stock variance is also associated with the standard 
deviation of premiums, and the rating of the group, with better rated groups exhibiting 
less variance. The returns to shareholders are also associated with stock variance and 
those stocks with greater returns exhibit greater variance during a one-year period. 
 Executives with a higher Vega seemed to do relatively less business in risky lines 
– they react in the opposite way expected for the one measurement that the market 
appears to be considering when variance of returns are determined. This puzzle is 
resolved somewhat in the robustness checks in section 6.1 where I find that firms 
increase their business in long-tailed lines faster than other premiums. The difference 
could be due to lagged reporting requirements and is an area for future research. 
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 According to these results the firm risk variables which markets pay attention to 
are the risk retained, the proportion of business in long-tailed lines and Best’s Capital 
Adequacy Ratio. The panel regression results show that executive’s incentives affect risk 
retention and the proportion of business in long-tailed lines. The panel regressions found 
that executives who had higher sensitivities to stock price volatility were actually doing 
less business in long-tailed lines, which seemed counterintuitive but these results indicate 
that firms which do less business in these lines have more stock return volatility – at least 
in the short term. Thus, executives appear to be behaving rationally in their lines-of-
business-business decision and increasing their stock volatility - and hence reward - by 
doing so. This is evidence that executives are responding to their incentives. The risk 
retained measure, however, goes in the opposite direction. Although executives with 
higher sensitivity to stock price volatility retain more risk in their firm, these companies 
appear to have lower stock price volatility overall. This effect becomes insignificant 
when other control variables are included in the regression, so it is likely another variable 
which affects both risk retained and stock price volatility that drives this result.
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5.5 Size of Effects and Relative Importance 
 Even if managerial incentives are important, there still remains the question of 
where they rank as a factor in determining firm decisions. If firm structure is more 
important and incentives are a secondary effect then this reduces the importance of 
paying a premium to hire any one CEO and give him the right incentives. Alternatively, it 
may be because the right CEO has already been hired and given a correct pay package 
that the firm structure decision drives effects. Thus, it is difficult to make an argument 
about the optimality of the market for executive talent, although I can examine it as it 
stands.  
 Making a manager more sensitive to stock volatility by one standard deviation, 
that is increasing his reward from a 0.01 change in stock volatility by $163,000 increases 
the risk retention of the firm by about 2% from a mean of 81% to 83% or 1/10th of a 
standard deviation, reduces the proportion of business in long-tailed lines by about 8% 
from  61% to 53%, would not have any significant effect on the premium/surplus ratio, 
and increases Best’s Capital Adequacy ratio by about 25, or 1/3rd of a standard deviation 
of this ratio though this last result it not significant. Naturally, the exact effect depends on 
which coefficients are used and which specification is preferred. The theoretically 
preferred specification uses instrumental variables with controls. Delta rarely appears to 
be significant in driving firm decisions and when it is, its effect is much smaller than the 
effect due to vega. The only significant effect for delta was in business in long-tailed 
lines, where increasing delta by one standard deviation reduces business in thelse lines by 
4%. Most of the power of vega is derived from the time-to-maturity of outstanding and 
granted options, a factor that is controllable by the granting boards. When included in 
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specification regressions, time to maturity is positively associated with the retention of 
risk and subsumes most of the effect of vega. Clearly, small changes in executive 
incentives can have a large effect on corporate decisions, although the actual effect of 
these changes and their relative size varies depending on the empirical specification.  
 To give an idea of how risk decisions respond to level of pay, I note that an 
executive seems to increase his group’s risk retention by 0.4% for every $100,000 paid in 
cash compensation in the IV regressions. $100,000 is about 1/8th of a standard deviation 
of pay for the normal CEO. At the average pay for an executive, risk retention is 
increased by 5.6 percent due to this cash pay according to the preferred IV regressions. 
Business in long-tailed lined of business does not seem to be affected by cash pay, but an 
executive who ages one year increases the proportion of this risky business by 0.18%. 
These effects can be put into perspective by looking at the change in firm size necessary 
to replicate them. An increase in firm size of one percent will decrease the firm’s risk 
retention by about 0.2% according to the IV regression. Note that this increase in firm 
size can represent a change of $35 million for the average firm. This illustrates how pay 
given to executives can actually be a relatively cheap way of implementing firm policy, 
rather than trying to adjust firm structure or the firm’s book of business. These structural 
costs increase greatly as firms increase in size, while the costs of incentives rise only with 
the wealth of the executive. The actual cost of increasing delta and vega varies with the 
executive’s specific wealth and options grants, but adjusting executive compensation is 
relatively cheaper, especially for large firms, than changing other aspects of firm 
structure such as size, premiums, and business.  
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6. Further Robustness Checks 
6.1 Change in Business in Long-Tailed Lines 
 If executives are taking on more relatively risky business in response to their 
incentives it should be possible to observe an increase in the business in these lines, even 
when controlling for the general increase in business. As before, I estimate two 
specifications whose results are presented in table 15. Columns 1and 2 contain the least-
squares fixed-effects regressions while columns 3 and 4 use instrumental variables with 
the t-2 value of Vega used to instrument Vegat-1.  
 The story of decisions for the regressions in sections 6.1-6.3 is as follows: the 
executive receives his incentives at the beginning of the year (t-1) in and a level of 
premiums is observed. I then measure if the granted incentives have an effect on the 
change in the variable and in what change that direction runs, so that I measure how 
much growth there  is in these variables over a year. The dependent variable is thus the 
difference in the observed risk variable. If executives respond to incentives then a higher 
vega should lead them to adjust that variable over the coming year. I run regressions both 
with and without control variables. The two general equations are: 
Equation 13 
tiittititi YSchedP ,1,31,1, εηδβυβ ++++=∆ −−  
and 
Equation 14 
itittititititi YCXSchedP εηβδβυββ ++++++=∆ −− ,41,31,2,1,  
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 Where SchedP is the amount of premiums written in long-tailed lines and X 
represents the standard control variables. Y represents the year dummies. 
 In most of the regressions incentive variables are insignificant, except for the 
instrumental-variable regression with controls. Here, vega is correlated with a positive 
growth in premiums in long-tailed lines. Thus, this test provides evidence that executives 
are following their incentives to invest more in lines traditionally considered riskier, 
although this risk may only manifest itself in the long-term. As expected, the only other 
significant determinant in the growth in business in long-tailed lines is the growth in total 
business. When controlling for endogeneity, it appears that vega has the effect of 
inducing the firm to conduct relatively more of its business in risky lines – more of the 
gain in business comes from doing business in risky lines than would be expected. This 
indicates that vega may play a role in encouraging executives to take on more risky 
business than they otherwise would, although it contradicts the earlier finding that vega 
appears to reduce the proportion of business in risky lines.
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6.2 Relative Growth in Business in Property Lines and Liability Lines 
 Similar to the test in section 6.1, I examine the growth in both property and 
liability lines. Liability lines are generally riskier than property lines, so vega should 
cause the change in these lines to increase more. Results for the regressions (similar to 
those in equations 13 and 14) are presented in tables 16 and 17. Again, the growth in 
premiums, the natural hedge due to correlation of investments and losses, and firm size 
are the most significant variables In the incentives-only IV regressions in column 3, vega 
has a negative effect. The coefficients on vega in column 3 of tables 16 and 17 are 
significantly different from each other – business in liability lines drops off significantly 
faster than business in property lines when vega is increased. This result implies that a 
higher vega leads to the firm taking on less risk, to the extent that liability lines are more 
risky than property lines. However, in my earlier robustness tests I could not reject that 
these lines were significantly different from each other in their effects on firm risk. 
Because I consider the measure of long-tailed lines to be more applicable than the naïve 
designation of property and liability, I consider the results of section 6.1 to be more 
sensible. However, there is evidence that managers are responding to incentives 
selectively by considering what business they focus on.
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6.3 Growth in surplus 
 I next examine the question of whether or not executives respond to incentives by 
changing the level of surplus at the firm. Earlier results indicated little effect on firm 
leverage and the earlier robustness tests indicate that managers appear to be reducing the 
risk in their business. I also wish to examine whether managers are reducing their surplus 
as well – whether the change in the ratio is due to an increase in premiums or a decrease 
in surplus. Regressions are run as in sections 6.1 and 6.2. I find that the growth in surplus 
is strongly related to the growth in premiums written, as is sensiblem but positively 
correlated wit hthe natural hedge, which is counterintuitive. However, column 3, the IV 
incentives regression, indicates that firms appear to be reducing surplus in response to a 
higher vega. That is they are taking on a more risky action. This could be due to the 
correlation of one of the structural variables with both vega and surplus as vega is not 
significant in column 4. However, an increase in delta results in a relative decrease in 
surplus when firm structure variables are considerd. Given the overall results in tables 15-
17 and 8, it appears that firms respond to an increase in vega by cutting premiums and 
surplus, but not cutting one more strongly than the other. Incentives do not appear to 
inspire managers to increase the risk profile of a firm through drastically altering its 
leverage in a particular way. This is, naturally, subject to the specification of these 
regressions. 
 This effect only shows up significantly in one specification of the results, so it 
cannot be considered to be strongly confirmed, but the coefficients in other specifications 
are generally in the same direction, although they are not significant.
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6.4 Management Team Regressions 
 There is the possibility that decisions are made not solely by the chief executive, 
but by the management team as a whole. If this is the case then the incentives given to the 
entire management team will be important. I calculate these by summing the values of 
delta and vega for each executive at a company in each year. The regressions and results 
presented in tables 6-9 are repeated using the equivalent incentive variables for the 
management team and results are presented in tales 19-22. As noted in the data 
description section, executives at levels below chief executive often receive significantly 
less pay, both in cash and incentives. 
 Regressions on risk retained indicate that delta appears to have little effect on risk 
retention, while an increase in vega causes managers to purchase less reinsurance, as 
theory predicts. Vega and delta also appear to be negatively associated with the 
proportion of business conducted in long-tailed lines, although the effect for vega is not 
significant and delta is only significant in one specification. There is only one significant 
results when considering the leverage decision – where vega is associated with a higher 
adequacy ratio in the fixed-effects regression with no incentives. The other insignificant 
specifications indicate that vega incourages leverage while an increase in delta 
discourages leverage. These results are similar to the CEO regressions for reinsurance 
purchase. The main conclusion to draw from these is that incentives given to the 
management team are similar to those given to CEOs and tend to confirm the previous 
results.
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6.5 Contemporaneous Instrumental Variable Regressions 
 
    To examine the robustness of regression results to model specification, I repeat 
the instrumental variable regressions using the contemporaneous (t) values of delta and 
vega, instrumenting vega with lagged (t-1) and predicted values. By using 
contemporaneous variables, these regressions are similar to the simultaneous equations. 
The exact specifications should be clear from tables 23 and 24 – the regressions are 
similar to those in columns 4,5 and 6 of tables 6-9. 
 These regressions indicate that there is little relationship between 
contemporaneous incentives and observable firm risk decisions. If the story I propose is 
true, then this is because managers are uncertain of the final value of their portfolios and 
hence te exact incentives that they have and firms have not had time to incorporate the 
decisions fully during the year. Contemporaneous vega is positively associated with more 
risk retain when only incentives are examined. Contemporaneous delta decreases the risk 
retention as well as the capital adequacy ratio, similar to previous findings. The age and 
tenure of the CEO as well as the AM best rating of the group are positively associated 
with business decisions, while there are mixed results for the concentration of group 
business. Leverage decisions are positively associated geographic diversification, 
concentration of ownership, AM Best rating and shareholder return. There are mixed 
findings for the loss ratio. Broadly, the incentives story is similar to what is established in 
the main regressions, but lagged values provide a better measure of the actual incentives 
given to management, given the timing of the variables and the ability to interpret and set 
optimal firm policy.
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7. Conclusion 
This study provides evidence that the incentives given to managers are an 
important determinant of the risk-management decision of insurance groups, although the 
statistical significance of their role shifts based on model specification and the decision 
being examined. The risk management decisions examined in this paper are a cleaner 
measure of corporate risk management than other proxies used in the literature as they are 
a pure measure of a company’s risk retention relative to bankruptcy risk and the riskiness 
of their business in general. By limiting my analysis to one specific industry, I am also 
able to include industry-specific control variables directly related to the business the firm 
conducts. This is an advancement of this study over others in the risk-management field.  
Managerial incentives appear to have an important effect on risk retention and are 
more important than several firm structure factors. The specific results of the examination 
of firm decisions and their relationship to risk management presented in this paper 
represent a puzzle. Executives do appear to be responding to the incentives that they are 
given in their compensation packages by retaining more of their business risk on firm's 
own books, but they also appear to be conducting less business in risky lines. Perhaps 
executives are selectively choosing to reinsure less of their preferred risk while 
conducting less risky business in general.  
The market appears to be basing its valuation of the firm mainly on the general 
riskiness of the firm’s business – what proportion of the firm’s premiums come from 
long-tailed lines. My results indicate that firms with more business in risky lines seem 
less volatile and this coincides with the results from the firm-decision regressions. If 
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executives are behaving rationally, then they should adjust their firm business in a way 
which causes the market to reward them. Executives should therefore be particularly 
sensitive to this decision variable when determining their firm policy. The leverage 
decision does not seem to be affected by executive incentives – they are finding other 
ways of responding. 
It is important to examine the strategies of groups, rather than individual 
companies, especially in the insurance industry, where intra-group reinsurance has 
significant effects on the cost of capital faced by an individual company and which can 
only be accurately accounted for by examination at the group level. Further, I show that it 
is important to include managerial, as well as structural, incentives when examining the 
decision processes of a firm. A useful robustness check would to be to examine banks, 
investment houses, and other risk-bearing institutions to see if these risk and incentive 
connections hold. Further expanding the insurance data set could also help to resolve 
some of the effects where managers seem to be operating contrary to their risk-reward 
incentives. 
This study has examined executive compensation as a key policy variable of 
firms. It has been shown here that risk-management decisions are significantly 
determined by managerial incentives, although not always as theory would predict, and it 
may be that this variable is one path by which incentives affect firm performance. The 
data set may also be used to provide detailed answers to other questions of to the 
insurance industry and their relation to the management team. Thus, there is significant 
opportunity for future research in this promising field.
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Appendix 1: Insurance Lines of Business 
Line Number Line Description 
1 Fire P 
2 Allied Lines P 
3 Farmowners Multiple Peril* 
4 Homeowners Multiple Peril* 
5 Commercial Multiple Peril* 
6 Mortgage Guaranty 
8 Ocean Marine* 
9 Inland Marine P 
10 Financial Guaranty 
11.1 Medical Malpractice (Occurrence)*L 
11.2 Medical Malpractice (Claims Made) L 
12 Earthquake P 
13 Group Accident and Health 
14 Credit Accident and Health (Group and Individual) 
15 Other Accident and Health 
16 Workers Compensation* L 
17.1 Other Liability (Occurrence)* L 
17.2 Other Liability (Claims Made) L 
18.1 Products Liability (Occurrence)* L 
18.2 Products Liability (Claims Made) L 
19.1 Private Passenger Auto Liability* L 
19.2 Private Passenger Auto Liability* L 
19.3 Commercial Auto Liability* L 
19.4 Commercial Auto Liability* L 
21 Auto Physical Damage P 
22 Aircraft (All Perils)* 
23 Fidelity 
24 Surety 
25 Glass 
26 Burglary and Theft P 
27 Boiler and Machinery* 
28 Credit 
29 International* 
30 Reinsurance (Non-Proportional Assumed – Property)* 
31 Reinsurance (Non-Proportional Assumed – Liability)* 
32 Reinsurance (Non-Proportional Assumed – Financial Lines)* 
33 Aggregate Other 
* = Denotes Long-Tailed line as identified in Phillips, Cummins & Allen(1996). Adjustments are made for 
lines whose definitions have since changed, particularly in claims vs. occurrence based lines. 
L = Line is defined as mainly a Liability line 
P = Line is defined as mainly a Property line 
 
Lines 7 and 20 are historical do not exist for the years in this data set
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Appendix 2: Insurance Group Names Appearing In Data Set 
 
ACE LTD 
AETNA LIFE & 
CASUALTY 
ALLIED GROUP 
ALLSTATE INS GRP 
AMBAC 
ASSURANCE CORP 
AMERICAN 
FINANCIAL INS GRP 
AMERICAN 
HEALTHCARE 
SPECIALTY 
AMERICAN INTL 
GRP 
AMERIN GROUP 
AMERISURE 
COMPANIES 
AXIS Capital Grp 
American Financial 
Grp 
Arch Ins Grp 
BANKERS INS GRP 
CAPITOL COUNTY 
GRP 
CENTRIS GROUP 
INC 
CHUBB & SON INC 
CIGNA HEALTH 
GRP 
CINCINNATI FNCL 
CP 
CMAC GROUP 
CNA INS GRP 
CRUM & FORSTER I 
C 
ENHANCE FNCL 
GRP 
EXECUTIVE RISK 
COMPANIES 
FIDELITY NATL FIN 
INC 
 
FIRST AMN TITLE 
FIRST STATE GROUP 
FRONTIER INS GRP 
GE GLOBAL GRP 
GENERAL ELECTRIC 
GENERAL 
REINSURANCE CP 
GOVERNMENT 
EMPLYS 
GREAT AMER PROP & 
CAS 
HARTFORD FIRE & 
CASUALTY GROUP 
HARTFORD STEAM 
BOILER GRP 
HORACE MANN 
GROUP 
INTEGON CORP 
INTERCARGO CORP 
GRP 
Infinity Prop & Cas Ins 
Grp 
LEUCADIA GRP 
LINCOLN NATIONAL 
LUMBERMENS MUT 
CAS GRP 
MASTERCARE CO INC 
METROPOLITAN GRP 
MGIC GRP 
MILWAUKEE INS GRP 
MORTGAGE 
GUARANTY CORP S/G 
OF 
MUNICIPAL BOND INV 
ASR CORP GRP 
MUTUAL ASSURANCE 
NAC RE CORP 
OHIO CASUALTY GRP 
OLD REPUBLIC GRP 
OMNI INS GRP 
ORION CAPITAL 
GROUP 
PMI GROUP OF 
COMPANIES 
PROGRESSIVE GRP 
PROTECTIVE LIFE INS 
GRP 
ProAssurance Corp Grp 
RHINE RE GRP 
RLI INSURANCE GROUP 
Radian Grp 
SAFECO INSURANCE 
GROUP 
SCOR REINS CO 
SELECTIVE 
INSURANCE 
SENTRY INSURANCE 
GROUP 
SKANDIA AMERICA 
GROUP 
ST PAUL COMPANIES 
SUTTER INS GRP 
TRENWICK GROUP INC 
UNITRIN GRP 
US FIDELITY & 
GUARANTY GROUP 
W R BERKLEY CORP 
WABASH LIFE 
INSURANCE GROUP 
WHITE MOUNTAINS 
GROUP 
WILLIAM LIFE INS 
GROUP 
X L AMERICA 
ZENITH NATIONAL INS 
GRP 
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Appendix 3: Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
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